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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

not apply. This construction seems contrary to the intention of congress,12 and it is an unreasonable and somewhat strained interpretation of the actual language of the statutes. It might lead to difficulties should the actual case for the taxation of the money itself be
presented.
WILLIAM MEDFORD.

Taxation-Exemption of State Governmental Instrumentalities
from Federal Taxation.
The plaintiff, a manufacturer of motorcycles in Massachusetts,
sold one of its machines to a Massachusetts municipality for use in
its police department. An excise tax was levied and collected from
the plaintiff in conformity with Revenue Act, 1924,1 §600, which
provides that there shall be paid upon motorcycles, etc., sold or leased
by the manufacturer, producer, or importer a tax equivalent to five
per cent of the price for which so sold or leased. The plaintiff sued
to recover the amount of the tax. Held: The tax was on the sale
alone and could not be upheld as it infringed the exemption of state
governmental instrumentalities from federal taxation. 2
The instant case follows the language of a bare majority decision
of the Supreme Court in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi,8 where a
state excise tax levied on the distributor of gasoline, assessed on the
number of gallons sold, was disallowed on a sale to a federal agency.
In the intervening case of Wheeler Lumber Co. v. U. S., 4 a united
court upheld a tax on transportation charges for materials sold and
shipped to state instrumentalities, on the ground that the tax was not
on the materials or the sale but on a preliminary service rendered the
seller. Decisions of a federal district court0 and of a state supreme
Congress, by these two acts, expressly provides for the exemption of this
money from taxation. The money, in the hands of federal authorities, could
not be assessed and taxed against an individual who has not received it. Therefore, this provision for tax exemption would seem superfluous in the light of
the reasoning of the Kansas court.
Two cases have applied the provisions of the instant statute to money
already paid the veteran. Payne v. Jordan, 152 Ga. 356, 110 S. E. 4 (1921)
(money held by administrator exempt from claims of creditors of veteran) ;
Wilson v. Sawyer, 177 Ark. 492, 6 S. W. (2d) 825 (1928), (sum paid to veteran
not subject to garnishment proceedings).
143 Stat. 322 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. §881 (1927).
'Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601 (1931).
Justice Stone dissents; Justice Brandeis concurs.
'277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857, 56 A. L. R. 583 (1928) which
overruled 147 Miss. 663 112 So. 584 (1927). Justices Holmes, Brandeis, Stone,
and McReynolds dissent.
'281 U. S. 572, 50 Sup. Ct. 419, 74 L. ed. 1047 (1930).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
court 6 have upheld taxes on the sellers of a fire engine and gasoline,
in the first case assessed on the price received, in the other on the
number of gallons sold, and in each case involving a sale to governmental agencies, as being occupational excise taxes alone. The same
tendency shown in all the above cases to uphold or disallow the taxes
involved on the ground of verbal differences in the way the tax is
7
imposed is recognizable in cases involving franchise taxes.
However, sporadic references to two fundamental conceptions,
although surrounded by discussions of the verbal variations of the
cases involved, lead to the conclusion that the real issue in each case
is between an absolute rule that the principle of exemption is not
affected by the extent of the resulting interference 8 and the degree
rule that immunity is given only from taxes that directly and substantially interfere with the efficient exercise of governmental functions.0 The degree-rule is to be preferred because the absolute-rule
by its own inclusiveness overrules all taxes imposing even a remote
interference, whereas the degree rule sets up a flexible standard, similar to that of the "reasonable man" test in negligence issues, under
which the court may fully consider the factual situations and the
economic consequences involved in such a tax. But no decision is
based solely upon either rule. Only in some dissenting opinions, as
of Justice Holmes in the Panhandle Oil case"0 and of Justice Stone
in the principal case" is the fundamental issue clearly shown.
'American-La France Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan, 294 Fed. 567 (W. D.
N. Y. 1923) overruled on other grounds in 6 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925).
'Grayburg Oil Co. v. State, 286 S.W. 489 (TEX. Civ. Ap,., 1926), affirmed

3 S. W. (2d) 427 (1928), reversed 278 U. S. 582, 49 Sup. Ct. 185, 73 L. ed. 519
(1928) in per curiam decision on authority of Panhandle case, supra note 3.
T (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 475, 477.

'There is no expressed constitutional guarantee of mutual immunity of
federal and state governmental instrumentalities from taxation, but the rule
was implied to preserve our dual system of government. Collector v. Day, 11
Wail. 113, 125, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871). The absolute rule, regardless of resulting
burdensome effect, following the "power to tax is the power to destroy" theory,

was announced in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 430, 4 L. ed. 579
(1819). It has been quoted in many cases, as in the principal case, supra note
2, at 575, 51 Sup. Ct. at 603.

'Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 30, 21 L. ed. 787, 793

(1873) "It cannot be said that a state tax which remotely affects the efficient
exercise of a federal power is for that reason alone inhibited by the constitution. To hold that would be to deny to the states all power to tax persons or
property." Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S.514, 524, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed.
384 (1926) ; Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S.379, 391-2, 51 Sup. Ct.
170, 75 L. ed. (Adv. 223), 71 A. L. R. 1226 (1930) ; Wilcutts v. Bunn, 282 U. S.
216, 225, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed. (Adv. 155), 71 A. L. R. 1260 (1930).
0Supra note 3, at 225. "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while
this court sits .... The question of interference with government, I repeat, is
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A recent decision' 2 involving the same fundamental problem was
hailed as ushering in the erstwhile dissenters as a majority prone to
consider somewhat expressly the actualities of the alleged interference. The present reversion to the technique of finding "verbal distinction, unfounded in economic realities"' 3 in the manner in which
different taxes are levied is sharply challenged by the frank, forceful
dissenting opinion.
TRAvis BROWN.
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one of reasonableness and degree and it seems to me that the interference in
this case is too remote."

1 Supra note 2, at 604.
Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, sup.ra note 9.
'Justice Stone's dissent, Justice Brandeis concurring, in principal case,
supra note 2, at 605, "Even if verbal distinctions, unfounded in economic
realities, must be made between the two cases (Panhandle Oil Co. and the principal case) so that both may stand as authoritative expositions of the constitution, considerations of substance rather than of form should lead us to choose
that one which would restrict the doctrine of the Panhandle Oil case to the tax
imposed in unqualified terms on sales to which it was applied in that case."

